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We show that quantum state discrimination sits neatly in the framework of Bayesian experimental
design. In this setting, the two main branches of quantum state discrimination (minimal error
and maximal confidence) simply correspond to two different utility functions. This view allows
straightforward extensions and mixing of different discrimination tasks by examining the utility
functions, and to describe multi-objective discrimination tasks. In addition, the probability of
success and the total confidence are resource monotones quantifying the usefulness of measurements.
We give general conditions under which utility functions lead to resource monotones in the resource
theory of quantum measurement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum state discrimination [1–3] is a foundational
task in quantum information theory in which an agent
tries to distinguish between a collection of quantum
states. If the states are not pairwise orthogonal, then no
measurement will be able to perfectly distinguish them.
Usually, one then seeks to find the optimal measurement
to discriminate between a given set of quantum states.
Quantum state discrimination is emerging as signifi-
cant in the field of resource theories as well. Resource
theories order states of a system in terms of their re-
sourcefulness with respect to a particular task. Discrim-
ination tasks have shown to be useful in characterising
resources in general resource theories [4]. The degree
of resourcefulness is quantified by real-valued functions
known as resource monotones, which can be generated
from state discrimination tasks [4–7]. In this context,
quantum state discrimination is not necessarily used to
find the ‘best’ measurement, but to quantify the useful-
ness of any (even a suboptimal) measurement.
Quantum state discrimination is typically thought to
have two primary branches. In the first, known as min-
imal error state discrimination, the agent attempts to
report the correct state while minimising the probability
of an error or equivalently, maximising the overall suc-
cess. In the second, known as maximal confidence state
discrimination, the agent tries to maximise the certainty
(or confidence) in each of their measurement outcome,
granting the additional ability to discard any measure-
ment result. Both these cases involve the agent trying to
best distinguish between quantum states, but they differ
in their respective notions of what constitutes ‘best’.
In this paper, we reframe both kinds of quantum state
discrimination as a Bayesian experimental design prob-
lem. This is a very general framework which is designed
∗ thomas.guff@students.mq.edu.au
to select the experiment which maximises a chosen util-
ity function. This utility function encodes what an agent
most values in the experiment. Quantum state discrim-
ination naturally fits within this framework, where in
place the best experiment, the agent searches for the best
quantum measurement to discriminate between quantum
states. We show that both minimal error and maximal
confidence state discrimination are Bayesian experimen-
tal design tasks, distinguished only by the choice of utility
functions.
This allows us to generalise quantum state discrimina-
tion tasks to other utility functions. We provide a natural
example of a utility function that leads to the mutual in-
formation between the measurement outcomes and the
transmitted states as the function the agent wants to op-
timise. The mutual information is a common measure of
the average information extracted from a quantum sys-
tem by a measurement device.
It also allows the description of multi-objective utility
functions. These are useful when we may wish to op-
timise an experiment in multiple stages, which may be
required to identify a unique optimal measurement. We
look at a well-known example of this for the case when
there is a heavy bias towards one particular state. In
this case a single stage of optimisation assigns the same
utility value to all measurements.
The framework of Bayesian experimental design makes
explicit the decision an agent will make after receiving the
measurement result but before concluding which state
they received. In typical treatments of quantum state
discrimination, this is usually subsumed into the mea-
surement itself. We keep these notions separate, as it
allows us to explore a wider range of POVMs and utility
functions.
The probability of success, which arises when studying
minimal error state discrimination, is a resource mono-
tone in the resource theory of measurement [7]. In fact,
the probability of success over all possible discrimination
alphabets forms a (uncountable) complete family of re-
source monotones [5, 7]. This means that discrimination
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2tasks can completely characterise the resource theory of
quantum measurements. Maximal confidence state dis-
crimination also leads to a resource monotone, which we
call the total confidence. The question then arises as to
which utility functions will give rise to resource mono-
tones. We provide three simple conditions on the utility
function, which if satisfied, lead to resource monotones
for quantum measurements. When these conditions are
satisfied there exists an optimal measurement with only
rank-1 POVM elements. Thus in the future, it might
be possible to use a broader range of utility functions
to create resource monotones to better characterise the
resource theory of quantum measurements.
II. QUANTUM STATE DISCRIMINATION
We first present the task of quantum state discrimina-
tion as it is commonly found in the literature [1–3]. In
particular we expound the two primary branches: min-
imal error and maximal confidence state discrimination.
As it will become necessary in the framework of Bayssian
experimental design, we make explicit the decision strat-
egy involved in selecting a quantum state; although in
standard treatments it is not necessary to consider the
decision explicitly.
The task of quantum state discrimination can be
framed as a communication protocol between two par-
ties. Suppose one party, Alice, wishes to send a classical
message to another, Bob. Alice will choose one of n dis-
tinct messages (labelled ν ∈ Sν = {1, . . . , n}) and encode
that message in an alphabet of quantum states, all of the
same (finite) dimension, so that message ν is encoded as
density operator ρν . Alice will then send ρν to Bob using
a noiseless quantum communication channel. Bob knows
that Alice intends to send message ν with probability
qν > 0 (
∑n
ν=1 qν = 1). Bob’s task is to determine Alice’s
message once he has received her state.
In order to infer Alice’s message, Bob measures the re-
ceived state. His choice of measurement α can be repre-
sented with a positive operator-valued measure (POVM).
That is, for every measurement outcome y ∈ Sy =
{1, . . . ,m}, there is a positive semi-definite linear opera-
tor Ay, such that
∀y : Ay ≥ 0,
m∑
y=1
Ay = 1. (1)
Bob wants the best measurement to discriminate between
the possible states Alice could send. Determining the
best POVM is the primary task of quantum state dis-
crimination. There are two main paradigms of quantum
state discrimination corresponding to different notions of
what Bob considers the ‘best’ POVM. Specifically, these
are when Bob values making as few mistakes as possible,
or having the largest possible confidence in each measure-
ment outcome.
1. Minimal Error State Discrimination
When the aim is to make as few mistakes as possi-
ble when reading Alice’s messages, Bob will choose the
POVM that minimises the average probability of error,
or equivalently, the POVM that maximises the average
probability of success. LetN represent the possible states
sent by Alice in one round of communication. Further,
let α represent the measurement that Bob uses on the
state Alice sent. We use the notation Nν to represent
the proposition that the state associated to message ν
was sent by Alice. Similarly we use the notation αj to
represent the proposition that Bob’s measurement α ob-
tained the result j, from which he will conclude that Al-
ice sent message j. With this notation, the probability
of success is
n∑
ν=1
p (αν |Nν) p (Nν) =
n∑
ν=1
qν tr (Aνρν) . (2)
Explicitly, this function is the average probability that
Bob’s measurement will display the correct outcome.
Finding the POVM which maximises the average proba-
bility of success is minimal error quantum state discrim-
ination. Analytic solutions for minimal error discrimi-
nation are known only for a few special cases such as
n = 2 [8] or when the alphabet exhibits specific symme-
tries [9, 10]. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the
optimal POVM have been known for some time [8, 11].
Focusing on the measurement, Eq. (2) is also measure
of the quality of a particular POVM in the context of this
particular discrimination task. That is, ’better’ measure-
ments are those which have a higher probability of success
within this particular state discrimination task. Here the
‘best’ measurement has been determined to be the one
that maximises the probability of success.
When defining the probability of success (2), we as-
sumed that the number of measurement outcomes was
the same as the number of states in the alphabet be-
ing sent to Bob by Alice. This assumption arises from
the implicit presumption that when Bob receives mea-
surement outcome j, he decides that Alice sent message
j. To generalise this to POVMs with arbitrary numbers
of measurement outcomes, we need to make explicit the
decision that Bob will make when he receives a measure-
ment outcome.
We make this explicit by defining a decision strategy
Γ : Sy → Sν as any function that maps measurement
outcomes to the alphabet of Alice’s possible messages.
Let Dj be the proposition that Bob’s decision was that
Alice sent ρj and thereby wishes to communicate mes-
sage j. Then the probability of success is the average
probability that Bob’s decision coincides with the state
that was sent to him,
n∑
ν=1
p (Dν |Nν) p (Nν) . (3)
3The decision strategy Γ may map multiple measurement
outcomes from Sy, to the same decision, ν. However we
can combine the POVM elements corresponding to each
decision without reducing the probability of success. To
see this note that if Bob makes decision ν, then it must
have been that his measurement device displayed a result
which would, given the decision strategy Γ, have caused
that decision. That is to say, the probability that Bob
receives outcome y and makes decision ν is
p (Dν , αy|Nν) = p (αy|Nν) δΓ(y),ν (4)
With this, we can expand (3) over the m measurement
outcomes (where m may not equal n),
n∑
ν=1
p (Dν |Nν) p (Nν)
=
n∑
ν=1
m∑
y=1
p (Dν , αy|Nν) p (Nν)
=
n∑
ν=1
m∑
y=1
p (αy|Nν) p (Nν) δΓ(y),ν
=
n∑
ν=1
∑
y∈Γ−1(ν)
p (αy|Nν) p (Nν) , (5)
where Γ−1(ν) is the set of all measurement outcomes
that leads Bob to decide ν given strategy Γ. Since
p (αy|Nν) = tr(Ayρν) is linear in the POVM element, we
can define a new measurement β with POVM elements
Bν =
∑
y∈Γ−1(ν)Ay, which will have the same proba-
bility of success as (5) (when using the corresponding
decision strategy). Thus within the confines of minimal
error state discrimination it is not necessary to consider
measurement devices with more than n outcomes; and
this is seen in the literature. However to interpret it in
the framework of Bayesian experimental design, we need
to separate the measurement outcome from the decision
strategy.
Even though, Bob may not have the optimal measure-
ment device, he will still want to use the best decision
strategy given his measurement device. That is, his prob-
ability of success should be maximised over all decision
strategies
max
Γ
n∑
ν=1
p (Dν |Nν) p (Nν) . (6)
It is simple to show that the best decision strategy, in the
case of minimal error state discrimination, is to always
choose the state with the largest posterior probability af-
ter the measurement. To demonstrate this, let us assume
a particular decision strategy Γ and expand (3) in terms
of the measurement outcomes
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Dν |αy, Nν) p (αy|Nν) p (ρν) . (7)
Since the decision depends solely on the measurement
outcome, we have p (Dν |αy, Nν) = p (Dν |αy), and
p (Dν |αy) represents the decision strategy. Since the de-
cision strategy is a deterministic function of the measure-
ment outcomes, the probabilities p(Dν |αy) are either 1
or 0.
If we define ρy? as the state with the largest posterior
probability given measurement outcome y,
y? := argmax
ν∈{1,...,n}
p (Nν |αy) , (8)
then, applying Bayes’ rule, we have
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Dν |αy) p (Nν |αy) p (αy)
≤
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Dν |αy) p (Ny? |αy) p (αy)
=
m∑
y=1
p (Ny? |αy) p (αy) . (9)
This inequality can clearly can be saturated since the last
line corresponds to the probability of success when the
decision strategy was to choose the state with the largest
posterior probability; that is, p (Dν |αy) = δν,y? .
2. Maximal Confidence State Discrimination
If the priority is having the maximal possible assurance
that each measurement outcome is accurate, a different
POVM will be considered the ‘best’ or optimal measure-
ment.
If the states in Alice’s alphabet are mutually orthog-
onal then there exists a measurement that can discrim-
inate between them with certainty and without error.
However, for certain alphabets which aren’t necessarily
mutually orthogonal, Bob can choose a POVM such that
each element is orthogonal to all but one of the possible
states. In this case there is a subspace in the support of
each state ρν that is not in the support of any other state
Alice could send. Hence the states ρ1, . . . , ρn will be lin-
early independent. If this subspace condition holds then
one can construct a POVM such that p (Nν |αy) = δν,y
for all y. That is, Bob is certain about which state
he was sent irrespective of which measurement outcome,
y ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, he received. This is known as unambigu-
ous state discrimination [12–16]. For an example, see
example 1 below.
For non-orthogonal alphabets, unambiguous state dis-
crimination can only be done at the cost of adding an
‘inconclusive’ outcome A0 to ensure the POVM sums to
unity. By convention when Bob obtains the inconclusive
outcome, he does not make a decision as to which state
was sent. Unambiguous state discrimination is possible
for n pure states if and only if they are linearly indepen-
dent [17]. Solutions for unambiguous state discrimination
4exist for up to three linearly independent pure states [18],
and n linearly independent symmetric states [19].
The generalisation to all alphabets is known as max-
imal confidence measurements [20], where Bob may no
longer have certainty in each measurement outcome, but
will be as certain as he possibly can be; that is he will
have the most confidence. Here Bob constructs the fol-
lowing measurement γ. For each message ν = 1, . . . , n,
he chooses POVM element Aν to associate to the mea-
surement outcome ν, such that it maximises p(Nν |γν),
Aν = argmax
0<A≤1
p (Nν |γν) = argmax
0<A≤1
qν tr(ρνA)
tr (A (
∑n
ν=1 qνρν))
.
(10)
Here we are maximising over all POVM elements A for
which p (γν) = tr (A (
∑n
ν=1 qνρν)) 6= 0. These are the
positive semi-definite operators that are not orthogonal
to every state in Alice’s alphabet. He then defines the
inconclusive outcome A0 := 1 −
∑n
ν=1Aν . Since the
trace function is linear, p (Nν |γν) is unchanged when Aν
is rescaled by a constant. Hence the elements Aν can be
rescaled to ensure that A0 is positive semi-definite.
This ability to rescale elements implies that there is a
(continuous) family of POVMs that maximises (11). To
select a unique member of this family, Bob typically per-
forms another optimisation: choosing, for example, the
POVM from this family that minimises the probability
of obtaining the inconclusive outcome, p(γ0). This is an
example of multi-objective optimisation, in which a sec-
ondary optimisation occurs subject to the constraint of a
previous optimisation. We will revisit this in section VI.
Unlike the best minimal error quantum measurement,
which maximises the probability of success (2), the max-
imal confidence measurement is constructed one element
at a time. Thus is it unclear how to measure the qual-
ity, or ‘confidence’, of a suboptimal measurement α with
outcomes y = 0, 1, . . . , n. We have not found such a mea-
sure in the literature, but we believe it to be intuitive and
reasonable to use the sum of the confidences of each out-
come
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν |αν) , (11)
where if p (αν) = 0 then we define p (Nν |αν) = 0. We
call this measure the total confidence. Clearly, the POVM
constructed in (10) independently optimise each term in
this sum, thereby maximising the total sum.
Once again, we would like to consider more general
POVMs by separating the measurement outcome from
the decision Bob makes after his measurement. In this
case we must include an ‘inconclusive’ decision, so now
the decision strategy Γ maps into the set Sν = {0, . . . , n}.
The quality of our measurement device is the probability
that Alice sent ρν given Bob decided on ρν . Using the
notation from sec. II 1, this is
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν |Dν) =
n∑
ν=1
p (Dν |Nν) p (Nν)
p (Dν)
=
n∑
ν=1
∑
y∈Γ−1(ν) p(αy|Nν)p (Nν)∑
y∈Γ−1(ν) p(αy)
=
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν |
∑
y∈Γ−1(ν)αy), (12)
where the summation of propositions denotes logical dis-
junction: α1 + α2 + . . . means α1 or α2 or . . . .
Once again, Bob wishes to use the best decision strat-
egy to maximise the total confidence of his measurement,
max
Γ
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν |αν) . (13)
Unlike minimal error state discrimination, Bob’s best
strategy here is not to choose the state with the largest
posterior probability. The best decision strategy will be
to assign a single measurement outcome to each decision
and to make no decision on all remaining measurement
outcomes. This is because making the same (conclu-
sive) decision on two measurement outcomes can never
do better than making that decision on only one of them.
To show this consider a decision strategy Γ such that
Γ (i) = Γ (j) = ν 6= 0, where i 6= j. Then if we examine
we p (Nν |Dν), we can rewrite it as
p (Nν |Dν) = p (Nν |αi + αj) = p (αi + αj |Nν) p (Nν)
p (αi + αj)
=
p (Nν |αi) p (αi) + p (Nν |αj) p (αj)
p (αi + αj)
. (14)
Since this is an weighted average of p (Nν |αi) and
p (Nν |αj) we have
p (Nν |Dν) ≤ max {p (Nν |αi) , p (Nν |αj)} . (15)
In other words, a better strategy would have been to have
made decision ν on the strategy on the measurement out-
come with the larger confidence, and to make no decision
on the other. Of course if p (Nν |αi) = p (Nν |αj), then
p(Nν |Dν) = p (Nν |αi) = p (Nν |αj) = p (Nν |αi + αj)
(16)
and the confidence in decision ν is unaffected.
Including Bob’s decision allows us to consider POVMs
with more elements than the number of messages in Al-
ice’s alphabet, now we can re-interpret quantum state
discrimination in the language of Bayesian experimental
design. However, just like with minimal state discrimi-
nation, this does not allow Bob to design a more optimal
POVM than the standard approach allows.
5III. BAYESIAN EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Here we describe the general formalism of Bayesian
experimental design, before showing that quantum state
discrimination straightforwardly fits into this framework.
The two different paradigms mentioned in the previous
section will simply correspond to different utility func-
tions
A. General Formalism
Bayesian experimental design is a framework for deriv-
ing the best experiment for a particular task, where the
notion of ‘best’ is encoded into a utility function U .
An intuitive introduction to Bayesian experimental de-
sign is through Bayesian decision theory [21], which in-
volves both inference and optimisation. We begin with a
problem in which we have an unknown variable N which
can take on any value ν from the set Sν , of which we
would usually like to know more. We will assume that
all sets are finite unless stated otherwise. There will be
some background information  ∈ S about the problem
(for example the particular experiment being performed),
and there will some relevant data y ∈ Sy about N such as
experimental or measurement results. We use y to repre-
sent the proposition that the experiment  generated data
y. Our knowledge of the variable N is then captured by
the conditional probability distribution p(Nν |y); where
we have used the notation Nν to stand for the proposition
that N = ν.
The experimenter will then make a decision, repre-
sented by variable D. The proposition that the particular
decision d from a set of possible decisions Sd is chosen is
represented by Dd. Usually this is a decision as to the
value of N . What we value in this experiment, which
depends on all the parameters for generality, is encoded
in a utility function
U : S × Sy × Sd × Sν → Rn, (17)
where Rn is considered as a vector space, and totally
ordered under the dictionary order (also known as the
lexicographic order). For example, in R2, (a, b) > (c, d)
if a > c or if a = c and b > d.
The objective in Bayesian decision theory is then to
pick the optimal decision d?. The optimisation process
should clearly be weighted by p (Nν |y), which the best
knowledge we have of ν. So for a given datum y, the
optimal decision should have the largest average utility
over P (Nν |y). That is,
d? = argmax
d∈Sd
∑
ν∈Sν
U(, y, d, ν) p(Nν |y). (18)
So the optimal decision yields a utility of
U(, y) = max
d∈Sd
∑
ν∈Sν
U(, y, d, ν) p(Nν |y). (19)
The extension to experimental design is then straight-
forward: we desire the best experiment ? from a set of
possible experiments S, averaged over all possible data
y ∈ Sy we could have received,
? = argmax
∈S
∑
y∈Sy
p(y) max
d∈Sd
∑
ν∈Sν
U(, y, d, ν) p(Nν |y)
= argmax
∈S
∑
y∈Sy
max
d∈Sd
∑
ν∈Sν
p(Nν , y)U(, y, d, ν). (20)
The last equation is in the form presented by the influ-
ential review [22], and is notable for explicitly including
the intermediate decision optimisation.
Instead of simply maximising over the possible deci-
sions as an intermediate step, we wish to generalise this
to optimise over all decision strategies more generally. A
decision strategy Γ : Sy → Sd is a function from the set of
possible data that could have been received Sy to the set
of possible decisions Sd. The set of all possible decision
strategies SΓ = Sd Sy is thus the set of all functions from
Sy to Sd. The utility function U is now
U : S × Sy × SΓ × Sν → Rn (21)
The expression for the best experiment, is now gener-
alised to
? = argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
∑
y∈Sy
∑
ν∈Sν
p(Nν , y)U(, y,Γ, ν). (22)
This generalised expression returns to (20) in the case
in which the utility function depends not on the entire
decision strategy Γ, but only on the particular decision
made d = Γ (y); in which case U(, y,Γ, ν) ≡ U(, y, d, ν).
This occurs when the best decision strategy is to simply
make the optimal decision for each measurement outcome
individually. Here the best decision strategy is to choose
Γ(y) such that
Γ (y) = argmax
d∈Sd
∑
ν∈Sν
p(Nν , y)U(, y, d, ν). (23)
This implies that the optimal measurement satisfies
argmax
∈S
∑
y∈Sy
max
d∈Sd
∑
ν∈Sν
p(Nν , y)U(, y, d, ν), (24)
which is the less general form we introduced earlier (20).
We saw earlier that the best decision strategy was to
choose the state largest posterior probability individually
for each measurement outcome. We will see that mini-
mal error can be derived from a utility function which de-
pends only on the particular decision made. In contrast,
we saw that the best decision strategy for the maximal
confidence measurements is not to choose the state for
which Bob has the largest confidence after each measure-
ment outcome. This implies that maximal confidence
cannot be derived from such a utility function.
6B. Application to State Discrimination
This framework can be specialised to both minimal
error and maximal confidence quantum state discrimina-
tion. In both cases, rather than searching for the optimal
experiment we are searching for the optimal quantum
measurement. Thus the set of experiments S is the (in-
finite) set of all POVMs. More precisely, let S(m) be the
set of all m-tuples of positive semi-definite linear oper-
ators (all defined on the same finite-dimensional Hilbert
space)
(A1, . . . , Am) (25)
such that
∑m
i=1Ai = 1. Then the set of all POVMs S is
S =
∞⋃
m=1
S(m) . (26)
We could instead choose to optimise over consider a
restricted subset of POVMs, this restriction may have
physical motivations due to an experimenter’s laboratory
set-up or technological limitations. However for the pur-
poses of this paper, we will allow the experimenter access
to all POVMs, as is typical in the literature.
The set of possible output data is the possible out-
comes of the particular POVM . Ifm is the number of el-
ements in the particular POVM , then Sy = {1, . . . ,m}.
The unknown parameter is the message sent by Alice,
so Sν = {1, . . . , n}, which she will encode into a quan-
tum state. In quantum state discrimination the set of
decisions is Sd = Sν ∪ {0}; the possible states that Al-
ice can send along with an ‘inconclusive’ decision, where
Bob makes no decision as to which state Alice sent. So
Bob will choose the measurement which maximises
? = argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , y)U(, y,Γ, ν). (27)
Initially, we will only consider a single-objective optimi-
sation: that is, U(, y,Γ, ν) ∈ R. Since the set S is infi-
nite, it is possible that no POVM maximises the utility
function. Usually the averaged utility function
U() = max
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , y)U(, y,Γ, ν) (28)
will be bounded, so it cannot take on arbitrarily large val-
ues. However, this does not guarantee that there exists a
POVM ?. Nevertheless, the function U() can be inter-
preted as quantifying how ‘good’ measurement  is at this
particular task. In section IV we will provide conditions
under which U() can be considered a resource monotone
in the resource theory of quantum measurements.
1. Minimal Error State Discrimination
In minimal error state discrimination, Bob values min-
imal error in his decision. That is, the utility function is
simply
U(, y,Γ, ν) = δΓ(y),ν , (29)
where Bob’s utility is zero if his decision does not corre-
spond to the state sent by Alice, and one if it does. Note
that Γ(y) ∈ {0, . . . , n} but ν ∈ {1, . . . , n}, so δ0,ν = 0 for
all ν.
Since this utility function is only dependent upon the
specific decision Bob makes after his measurement, we
can use the form (20). For this utility function, the op-
timal POVM e? satisfies
? = argmax
∈S
n∑
y=1
max
d∈Sd
p (Nd|y) p (y) . (30)
By inspection, this expression is equivalent to (9): Bob
wants the POVM which maximises the average probabil-
ity that the measurement correctly identifies the state
sent by Alice when using the best decision strategy:
namely choosing the state which maximises the posterior
probability. Note that since the inconclusive outcome
counts as an error, Bob will never choose the inconclu-
sive decision in the context of minimal error quantum
state discrimination.
2. Maximal Confidence State Discrimination
In maximal confidence state discrimination, Bob val-
ues the confidence in each decision he makes. It can be
derived it from the utility function
U (, y,Γ, ν) =
δΓ(y),ν
p
(
DΓ(y)
) , (31)
where Bob’s utility is inversely proportional to the prob-
ability of making that decision, to compensate for how
rarely that decision is made. Note that p(DΓ(y)) is cal-
culated under the assumption that Bob has chosen mea-
surement ,
p(DΓ(y)) =
m∑
j=1
p(DΓ(y)|j)p(j)
=
∑
j∈Γ−1(y)
p(j). (32)
Although this utility function might appear to only
depend on a single decision, it actually depends on the
entire decision strategy, since p
(
DΓ(y)
)
is only calculable
with the knowledge of the entire decision strategy Γ, for
we need to know how many measurement outcomes map
to the same decision Γ (y).
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? = argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν , y) δΓ(y),ν
p
(
DΓ(y)
)
= argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
n∑
ν=1
∑
y∈Γ−1(ν)
p (Nν , y)
p (Dν)
= argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν |Dν) , (33)
where in the last equality we used the fact that∑
y∈Γ−1(ν) p (Nν , y) = p (Nν , Dν). This final expression
(33) is that which we have for a maximal confidence mea-
surement (12).
As mentioned in section II, in general there will be a
family of measurements which maximise the total confi-
dence. One can then prefer a member of this family by
requiring an additional optimisation; such as the mem-
ber which minimises the probability of the inconclusive
outcome. We return to this idea in section VI.
IV. CONDITIONS FOR RESOURCE
MONOTONES
We have seen that the probability of success (9) and the
total confidence (13) serve as measures of the quality of
a POVM at a particular discrimination task. In this sec-
tion we formalise that notion, by showing that these mea-
sures are actually resource monotones in the resource the-
ory of quantum measurements. This implies that if you
stochastically scramble any POVM it will perform worse,
according to these measures, at discriminating quantum
states for any alphabet Alice uses. To show this we first
describe general conditions under which the utility func-
tion U(, y,Γ, ν), will produce a resource monotone U()
(28).
Let measurement α be represented by (A1, . . . , Am)
and measurement β be represented by (B1, . . . , Bm′),
then the resource theory of quantum measurements or-
ders α ≥ β, if we can write for all i = 1, . . . ,m′,
Bi =
m∑
j=1
p(βi|αj)Aj . (34)
That is, β is a stochastic mixing of α. This transforma-
tion of α into β is sometimes known as post-processing.
A resource monotone in the resource theory of quantum
measurements [7], is a function
f : S → R, (35)
such that if α ≥ β, then f(α) ≥ f(β). So a resource
monotone assigns a real number to each measurement,
and it respects the ordering of the resource theory. It is
well known that the probability of success is a resource
monotone for the resource theory of quantum measure-
ments [5, 7]. Indeed, the total confidence (12) is a mono-
tone as well. This suggests that the utility U() (28)
may generally be resource monotones in the case when
U() ∈ R. However the utility function U(, y,Γ, ν) is
so general (we have hitherto placed no restrictions on
it) that U() will not typically be a resource monotone.
For example, if α ≥ β, then a possible utility function
could satisfy U(β, y,Γ, ν) = 1 for all y, Γ and ν, and
U(α, y,Γ, ν) = 0 for all y, Γ and ν; this would clearly
not lead to a resource monotone. In this section we de-
tail three conditions on the utility function U(, y,Γ, ν)
which guarantee that U() will become resource mono-
tone.
C1 Let the measurement α be represented by the
POVM (A1, . . . , Am) with decision strategy Γ.
Suppose that Ai, Aj are both non-zero and propor-
tional to each other, and that Γ(i) = Γ(j). Then
U(α, i,Γ, ν) = U(α, j,Γ, ν) for all ν = 1, . . . , n.
C2 Let the measurement α be represented by the
POVM (A1, . . . , Am) . Suppose that Ai, Aj are
non-zero and proportional to each other. Then the
optimal decision strategy,
Γ∗ = argmax
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , αy)U(α, y,Γ, ν), (36)
assigns Γ∗(i) = Γ∗(j).
C3 Let the measurement α be represented by the
POVM (A1, . . . , Ai, . . . , Aj , . . . , Am) with decision
strategy Γ. Suppose that Γ(i) = Γ(j), and consider
the m− 1 outcome measurement α′ represented by
POVM
(A1, . . . , Ai +Aj , . . . , Am). (37)
Let us label the measurement outcomes for this
new POVM {1, . . . , i+ j, . . . ,m} and also consider
induced decision strategy Γ′ that assigns to every
outcome in α′ the same decision as was assigned
by Γ to measurement outcomes of α, in particular
we define Γ
′
(i + j) = Γ(i) = Γ(j). Then for all
ν = 1, . . . , n,
U(α′, i+ j,Γ′, ν)
≤ p(αi|Nν)U(α, i,Γ, ν) + p(αj |Nν)U(α, j,Γ, ν)
p(αi + αj |Nν) ,
(38)
with equality if Ai and Aj are proportional and
non-zero; and
U(α′, k,Γ′, ν) = U(α, k,Γ, ν), (39)
for all k 6= i, j.
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that values the ability of a quantum measurement to ex-
tract information from the quantum state. The first two
conditions describe POVMs with non-zero elements that
are proportional. From the perspective of information
extraction, measurement outcomes from proportional el-
ements provide the same amount of information; there-
fore their utilities should be the same, and the best de-
cision strategy should make the same decision for both
outcome. The third condition relates to merging two
measurement outcomes, a transformation that can only
degrade the ability of a measurement to extract infor-
mation. Here we require that the utility is at best the
average of the utility of the two prior measurement out-
comes.
We now prove that if U(, y,Γ, ν) satisfies these three
conditions then U() is a resource monotone.
Theorem 1. Let the measurement α be represented
by the POVM (A1, . . . , Am), and β be represented by
(B1, . . . , Bm′), related to α by stochastic mixing
Bi =
m∑
j=1
p(βi|αj)Aj , (40)
for all i = 1, . . . ,m′, and let a utility function U(, y,Γ, ν)
satisfy conditions C1, C2 and C3, then U(α) ≥ U(β),
where U() is defined as in (28).
Proof. Let U(, y,Γ, ν) satisfy conditions C1, C2 and
C3. Let Γ∗β be the optimal decision strategy for mea-
surement β, that is
Γ∗β = argmax
Γ∈SΓ
m′∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , βy)U(β, y,Γ, ν). (41)
Now let us create the (m×m′)-outcome measurement β′,
whose POVM is created by using every term in all the
sums represented by (40),
(p(β1|α1)A1, . . . , p(βm′ |αm)Am) . (42)
Let us label the measurement outcomes of this new
POVM by the pair (i, j), where (i, j) corresponds to
the POVM p(βi|αj)Aj . We associate to this POVM
the induced decision strategy Γ∗′β which makes the same
decision as was made for the measurement β; that is
Γ∗′β (i, j) = Γ
∗
β(i).
Now it is clear that β (with decision strategy Γ∗β) can
be derived from β′ (with decision strategy Γ∗′β ) using a
finite number of merging operations described in C3: β
is recovered by combining all outcomes with first index i.
This can be done one at a time, each time applying the
inequality described in C3. Finally, we have
U(β) =
m′∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , βy)U(β, y,Γ
∗
β , ν)
≤
m′∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , β
′
(i,j))U(β
′, (i, j),Γ∗′β , ν). (43)
Since the strategy Γ∗′β is possibly suboptimal, we know
that
U(β) ≤ max
Γ∈SΓ
m′∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , β
′
(i,j))U(β
′, (i, j),Γ, ν),
= U(β′). (44)
Now β′ has many POVM elements which are proportional
to each other; specifically the element corresponding to
outcome (i, j) is proportional to the element correspond-
ing to (i′, j) for all i, i′, j. By condition C2, the optimal
decision strategy Γ∗β′ will assign the same state to pro-
portional, non-zero elements,
Γ∗β′(i, j) = Γ
∗
β′(i
′, j) for all i, i′, j. (45)
It is irrelevant how we assign decisions or even utilities for
measurement outcomes represented by POVM elements
which are zero. This is because they will occur with zero
probability, and will contribute nothing towards U().
Hence we can assume all elements are non-zero without
loss of generality.
By condition C1 the utility function is constant over
non-zero proportional POVM elements which are as-
signed the same decision; that is we can write
U(β′, (i, j),Γ∗β′ , ν) = U(β
′, j,Γ∗β′ , ν), (46)
for all i = 1, . . . ,m′. If we use this notation we have
U(β′) =
m′∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , β
′
(i,j))U(β
′, (i, j),Γ∗β′ , ν)
=
m′∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
ν=1
p(βi|αj)p(Nν , αj)U(β′, j,Γ∗β′ , ν)
=
m∑
j=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , αj)U(β
′, j,Γ∗β′ , ν). (47)
We now need to relate the last line to U(α). The POVM
α can also be reconstructed from β′ by combining all out-
comes (i, j) with the same second index j. Since these are
POVM elements are proportional, the equality condition
in C3 along with C1 implies
U(β′, j,Γ∗β′ , ν) = U(α, j,Γ
′
α, ν), (48)
where Γ′α is the decision strategy induced from Γ
∗
β′
Γ′α(j) = Γ
∗
β′(i, j) for any i = 1, . . . ,m
′. (49)
From (48) and (47), we have
U(β′) =
m∑
j=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , αj)U(α, j,Γ
′
α, ν)
≤ max
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
j=1
n∑
ν=1
p(Nν , αj)U(α, j,Γ
′, ν)
= U(α). (50)
This with (44) implies U(β) ≤ U(α).
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(12) are resource monotones. This can be checked di-
rectly, however here we will show that the utility func-
tions which generate these two functions satisfy all three
conditions stated above.
For minimal error state discrimination, the utility func-
tion was simply
U(, y,Γ, ν) = δΓ(y),ν . (51)
Now if Γ(i) = Γ(j) then we have U(, i,Γ, ν) =
U(, j,Γ, ν), hence we immediately have that this util-
ity function satisfies conditions C1 and C3. To see that
C2 is satisfied, recall that we showed that the best de-
cision strategy was always to choose the state with the
highest posterior probability after the measurement. But
if two POVM elements are proportional, then all poste-
rior probabilities are identical. This can be seen in (10),
where multiplying A by a constant doesn’t change the
posterior distribution. Hence for proportional elements
Ai and Aj , the best decision strategy will always be to
assign Γ(i) = Γ(j).
Maximal confidence measurements had a slightly more
complicated utility function
U(, y,Γ, ν) =
δΓ(y),ν
p(DΓ(y))
. (52)
Once again, we can immediately see that this utility func-
tion meets conditions C1 and C3, since if Γ(i) = Γ(j),
then U(, i,Γ, ν) = U(, j,Γ, ν). To establish C2, recall
that the best decisions strategy involved mapping only
single measurement to the possible quantum states, and
mapping the rest to the inconclusive outcome. There
we saw that mapping two measurement outcomes to the
same quantum state would cause a decrease in the to-
tal confidence (15), unless the measurement outcomes
yielded the same posterior probability, which is certainly
true for measurement outcomes corresponding to propor-
tional POVM elements.
V. OTHER UTILITY FUNCTIONS
The framework of Bayesian experimental design allows
us to consider different utility functions, and thus value
quantities other than minimal error or maximal confi-
dence. For example, if we have a utility function of
U (, y,Γ, ν) = log (p (Nν |y)), then the best POVM ?
is
? = argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν , y) log (p (Nν |y))
= argmax
∈S
−H (N |) = argmin
∈S
H (N |) . (53)
So the best POVM is the one that minimises the con-
ditional entropy of the variable N , given . The utility
function here doesn’t depend at all on Bob’s decision.
Rather, it only values the ability of Bob’s measurement
to extract the most amount of information on average.
If we add a constant to the utility function we do not
change which measurement is optimal. Let us consider
U (, y,Γ, ν) = log (p (Nν |y))−
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν) log (p (Nν))
= log (p (Nν |y)) +H (N) , (54)
where H (N) is the Shannon entropy of the probability
distribution of variable N . Now the best POVM is
? = argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν , y) log (p (Nν |y)) +H (N)
= argmax
∈S
I (N : ) , (55)
where I (N : ) is the mutual information between vari-
ables N and . This is a common measure of the informa-
tion gained from a quantum measurement. Since H(N) a
constant term of Bob’s choice of POVM, the same POVM
which minimises the conditional entropy, will maximise
the mutual information.
We can use the conditions described in the previous
section to show that −H(N |) and I(N : ) are resource
monotones. Since the utility function is a function of the
posterior distribution p(Nν |y), it is constant over POVM
elements which are proportional to each other, meeting
condition C1. Condition C2 is met trivially, since this
utility function is independent of the decision strategy.
Condition C3 is less trivial. From Bayes’ rule, we have
that
p(Nν |αi + αj) = p(αi)p(Nν |αi) + p(αj)p(Nν |αj)
p(αi + αj)
. (56)
Since the function x log(x) is convex we have the inequal-
ity
p(Nν |αi + αj) log(p(Nν |αi + αj))
≤ p(αi)
p(αi + αj)
p(Nν |αi) log(p(Nν |αi))
+
p(αj)
p(αi + αj)
p(Nν |αj) log(p(Nν |αj)). (57)
Again applying Bayes’ rule to all three coefficients, we
can re-write this inequality as
log(p(Nν |αi + αj))
≤ p(αi|Nν) log(p(Nν |αi)) + p(αj |Nν) log(p(Nν |αj))
p(αi + αj |Nν) ,
(58)
which is exactly condition C3. From (56) we see that if
Ai and Aj are proportional, then
p(Nν |αi + αj) = p(Nν |αi) = p(Nν |αj), (59)
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which is the equality condition.
The quantities −H(N |) and I(N : ) are resource
monotones for the stochastic mixing of POVMs. This
means that if α ≥ β under stochastic mixing, then for
any resource monotone f , f(α) ≥ f(β). This implies that
there always exists an optimal POVM for these functions
that is constructed from only rank-1 POVM elements,
since any POVM can be generated from a stochastic mix-
ture of a rank-1 POVM. To see this, consider the POVM
(A1, . . . , Am) and consider the spectral decomposition
Ai =
d∑
j=1
λij
∣∣λij〉〈λij∣∣ , (60)
for each i = 1, . . . ,m. The collection of all rank-1 ele-
ments (
λ1
∣∣λ11〉〈λ11∣∣ , . . . , λmd |λmd 〉〈λmd |) . (61)
is itself a POVM. The original POVM (A1, . . . , Am) can
easily be seen as a stochastic mixture of this POVM.
This argument also holds for the probability of suc-
cess (3) and the total confidence (12). Since their util-
ity functions also satisfy C1-C3, this also implies that
the optimal POVM in those cases would consist of rank-
1 POVM elements. However, as mentioned earlier, one
need not restrict to POVMs with only rank-1 elements
in the context of minimal error and maximal confidence
state discrimination. This is because, for a given decision
strategy Γ, we can create a new POVM by combining the
elements of a rank-1 POVM corresponding to each deci-
sion ν. This new POVM will have the same probability
of deciding on ν. This does not hold for the mutual or
conditional entropy since the entropy is not a function of
the probability of the decision, but the probability of the
measurement outcome.
Indeed, one might want to consider the conditional en-
tropy and mutual information based on Bob’s decision
rather than his measurement outcome. That is
U (, y,Γ, ν) = δΓ(y),ν log
(
p
(
Nν |DΓ(y)
))
. (62)
This leads to the following optimisation,
argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
n∑
ν=1
m∑
y=1
p (Nν , y) δΓ(y),ν log
(
p
(
Nν |DΓ(y)
))
.
= argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
m∑
y=1
p
(
NΓ(y), y
)
log
(
p
(
NΓ(y)|DΓ(y)
))
= argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
n∑
d=1
p (Nd, Dd) log (p (Nd|Dd))
= argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
−H (N |D) . (63)
We can likewise add a constant H (N) to convert this to
the mutual information I (N : D). Thus in this case we
want to optimise the correlations between the decision
Bob makes and the state Alice sends.
VI. MULTI-OBJECTIVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS
In this section we look at multi-objective utility func-
tions, which are useful when one would like to consider
multiple optimisations in sequence. This would arise
when a single utility function does not choose a single
optimal measurement. This can arise in the context of
both maximal confidence and minimal error state dis-
crimination. Here we allow the utility function to be
vector valued, equipped with the dictionary order (de-
scribed in the early paragraphs of section III).
A. Maximal Confidence State Discrimination
Recall that in the construction of the maximal confi-
dence measurement (10), rescaling the POVM elements
by a constant does not change the confidence in that mea-
surement outcome, so there is a continuous family of mea-
surements that all have the maximal possible confidence.
However rescaling POVM elements can change the prob-
ability of the inconclusive outcome. Since the inconclu-
sive outcome is undesirable, one therefore may wish to
choose the maximal confidence measurement which min-
imises the probability of the inconclusive outcome. Let
us show a simple example of this.
Example 1. Let Alice use two possible qutrit states ρ1
and ρ2 to encode her messages, and she will send the
messages with equal probability q1 = q2 =
1
2 . Using the
notation that |±〉 = 12 (|1〉 ± |2〉), let
ρ1 =
1
2 (|0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|) ,
ρ2 = |+〉〈+| .
(64)
These two states can be distinguished unambiguously, for
example, if we choose A1 = a1 |−〉〈−| and A2 = a2 |2〉〈2|
then p (ρ1|A1) = p (ρ2|A2) = 1. There is also the in-
conclusive outcome represented by A0 = 1 − A1 − A2,
which is only positive semi-definite when 0 ≤ a1 ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ a2 ≤ 2−2/(2−a1). Any choice of a1, a2 within these
parameters is a valid POVM which will unambiguously
distinguish between ρ1 and ρ2, but clearly some choices
are better than others; if both a1 and a2 are vanishingly
small then the inconclusive outcome will almost always
register. Thus parameters are ideally chosen to minimise
the probability of the inconclusive outcome p (A0). In
this case that is achieved by making a1 as small as pos-
sible and a2 as large as possible, for which p (A0) ap-
proaches 34 .
In fact, one can do even better since A1 and A2 did
not fully characterise the set of maximal confidence mea-
surements. One can choose the projective measurement
B1 = |0〉〈0|, B2 = |2〉〈2|; which implies that B0 = |1〉〈1|.
Here the probability of the inconclusive outcome p (B0) =
1
2 , and cannot be improved by rescaling B1 and B2.
This demonstrates that the family of maximal confidence
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measurements won’t always be related to each other by
rescaling.
This secondary optimisation can be easily incorporated
into Bayesian experimental design by considering utility
functions whose image lies in R2, ordered under the dic-
tionary order. For example, Bob may want the maximal
confidence measurement which, within this family, max-
imises the probability of success (3). This happens to be
equivalent to choosing the maximal confidence with the
smallest probability of yielding the inconclusive outcome.
For any maximally confident POVM, the probability of
success is
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν |Dν) p (Dν) =
n∑
ν=1
cν p (Dν) , (65)
where cν = p (ρν |Dν) are constants within the set of max-
imally confident POVMs. Define c0 as the positive num-
ber for which
n∑
ν=1
cν p (Dν) + c0 p (D0) = 1. (66)
Thus we see that maximising the probability of success
is equivalent to minimising the probability of the incon-
clusive outcome
n∑
j=1
cj p (Dj) = 1− c0 p (D0) . (67)
If Bob desires a maximal confidence measurement
which has the smallest probability of acquiring the in-
conclusive outcome, then Bob’s utility function is
U(, y,Γ, ν) =
(
δΓ(y),ν
p
(
DΓ(y)
) , 1− δΓ(y),0
)
, (68)
which encodes that Bob first wants to maximise the con-
fidence, and only then search for the POVM with the
lowest inconclusive probability.
The optimal POVM now satisfies
? = argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
(U1(,Γ), U2(,Γ)) (69)
where
U1(,Γ) =
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν , y) δΓ(y),ν
p
(
DΓ(y)
)
=
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν |Dν) . (70a)
U2(,Γ) =
m∑
y=1
n∑
ν=1
p (Nν , y)
(
1−δΓ(y),0
)
= 1−p (D0) . (70b)
Maximising under the dictionary order maximises each
expression in order, subject to all previous expressions
being maximised. Therefore, in this case the best mea-
surement is the maximal confidence measurement that
minimises the probability of the null decision.
B. Minimal Error State Discrimination
There are examples for which it would be useful to
perform a secondary optimisation on minimal error mea-
surements.
In [23], the author derives the following result: if there
exists a ρm in Alice’s alphabet which satisfies
qmρm − qkρk ≥ 0, for all k, (71)
then the optimal measurement is represented by the
POVM, whose jth element is δj,m1. In other words, the
optimal measurement is to perform no measurement and
simply guess the state ρm. The author shows that this set
of inequalities can be satisfied with non-trivial alphabets.
This appears counter-intuitive; measurements which
provide some information should always be better (as
we need not act on it). In fact, if (71) is satisfied, all
measurements have the same (and hence optimal) prob-
ability of success after optimising over the decision strat-
egy. From (71) we have, for all k, and for any positive
semi-definite operator Aν ≤ 1,
tr ((qmρm − qkρk)Aν) ≥ 0,
tr (qmρmAν) ≥ tr (qkρkAν) ,
P (ρm|Aν)P (Aν) ≥ P (ρk|Aν)P (Aν) ,
P (ρm|Aν) ≥ P (ρk|Aν) . (72)
That is, the state ρm will always be the state with the
largest posterior probability, no matter the measurement
or the measurement result. Therefore, regardless of what
measurement Bob does, his best decision is to always
choose that Alice sent state ρm. For these kinds of al-
phabets and prior probabilities any measurement device
is as good as any other in the context of minimal error
state discrimination. This includes the trivial measure-
ment, represented with a single non-zero POVM element,
and physically corresponds to Bob doing no measurement
and simply deciding that Alice sent ρm every time.
But each non-trivial measurement still provides infor-
mation about Alice’s state though and further measure-
ments may lead to Bob changing his decision. To see
this, we can generalise the condition (71) to the case of
repeated messages.
Proposition 1. Suppose Alice sends d copies of the same
state. After Bob performs a local measurement on each
individual state sent, then ρm will always have the largest
posterior probability if and only if
d
√
qmρm − d√qkρk ≥ 0 for all k. (73)
Proof. Suppose (73) holds; then for any positive semi-
definite operator Aj ,
d
√
qm Tr (ρmAj) ≥ d√qk Tr (ρkAj) , (74)
for all k. This inequality holds if we take the product of d
such terms. Let A
(i)
j denote that result Aj was measured
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FIG. 1. Even when an alphabet and prior probabilities satisfy
the conditions in (71), repeated measurements can provide
enough information to make Bob not choose ρm. In this ex-
ample Alice’s alphabet consists of states ρ1 =
5
6
|0〉〈0|+ 1
6
|1〉〈1|
and ρ2 = |+〉〈+|. The prior probabilities are q1 = 0.85 and
q2 = 0.15. The posterior probabilities for q1 (dark) and q2
(light) over the course of three repeated measurements using
POVM {A1 = |0〉〈0| , A2 = |1〉〈1|}. We have q1ρ1 − q2ρ2 ≥ 0,
so no single measurement could cause Bob to choose ρ2 over
ρ1. However since
√
q1ρ1 − √ρ2ρ2 6≥ 0, there exists a two-
measurement record (in this case, receiving the outcome A2
on the first two measurements) which can cause Bob to choose
ρ2.
on the ith system.
d∏
j=1
d
√
qm Tr
(
ρmA
(j)
j
)
≥
d∏
j=1
d
√
qk Tr
(
ρkA
(j)
j
)
,
⇒ qm
d∏
j=1
Tr
(
ρmA
(j)
j
)
≥ qk
d∏
j=1
Tr
(
ρkA
(j)
j
)
, (75)
so P
(
ρm|A(1)1 . . . A(d)d
)
≥ P
(
ρk|A(1)1 . . . A(d)d
)
, for all k.
If (73) doesn’t hold, then there exists a positive semi-
definite operator B and state ρk such that
d
√
qm Tr (ρmB) < d
√
qk Tr (ρkB) . (76)
Taking the dth power of both sides,
qm Tr (ρmB)
d
< qk Tr (ρkB)
d
, (77)
and so P
(
ρm|B(1) . . . B(d)
)
< P
(
ρk|B(1) . . . B(d)
)
; there
exists a measurement record which would cause Bob to
decide that Alice sent ρk where k 6= m.
Clearly, (71) is the case where d = 1.
Non-trivial measurements still provide Bob with infor-
mation, modifying his posterior knowledge of what Alice
sent; however no measurement exists which could over-
turn his bias that ρm is the most probable state, as re-
flected in the prior probabilities. Indeed it can be argued
that performing no measurement is the least useful, since
if Alice were to send multiple copies, non-trivial measure-
ments exist which could indeed cause Bob to change his
mind, as illustrated in fig 1.
Since all states contain the same probability of error, it
is sensible to perform a second optimisation to select the
optimal measurement. The condition (71) will enforce
that p(Nm|y) ≥ p(Nk|y) for all k = 1, . . . , n, and for any
outcome y of any measurement . Therefore, since the
optimal decision strategy of minimal error state discrim-
ination is to choose the state with the highest posterior
probability, then we know that p(Dm) = 1. This means
that using utility functions in the secondary optimisation
which depend on Bob’s decision will be equally unhelp-
ful. A more useful candidate is the mutual information
described in section V; which measures how much infor-
mation the measurement gains about which state Alice
sent. Let our multi-objective utility function be
U(, y,Γ, ν) =
(
δΓ(y),ν , log (p (Nν |y)) +H(N)
)
. (78)
The measurement ? which maximises this utility func-
tion will satisfy
? = argmax
∈S
max
Γ∈SΓ
(
n∑
ν=1
p(Dν |Nν)p(Nν) , I(N : )
)
.
(79)
Of course the condition (71) implies that∑n
ν=1 p(Dν |Nν)p(Nν) = p(Nm), assuming the opti-
mal decision strategy of choosing the state with the
largest posterior distribution. Therefore this utility
function will select the measurement ? that maximises
the mutual information I(N : ), that is the state
which extracts the most information, along with the
decision strategy of choosing the state with the largest
posterior distribution. This is a more sensible choice
for the optimal measurement than simply the trivial
measurement.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we showed how quantum state discrim-
ination fits neatly into Bayesian experimental design.
Bayesian experimental design is a very general frame-
work designed to give a methodology to finding an op-
timal experiment. Since quantum state discrimination
is typically concerned with finding the optimal measure-
ment to discriminate between quantum states, it is un-
surprising that quantum state discrimination can be cast
into this framework. From this perspective the stan-
dard paradigms of minimal error state discrimination
and maximal confidence state discrimination are the opti-
mal measurements corresponding to different utility func-
tions.
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The utility function encodes the priorities of the ex-
perimenter. In minimal error state discrimination, the
priority is to make as few mistakes as possible. In maxi-
mal confidence state discrimination, the priority is having
the maximal possible assurance that each measurement
outcome is accurate. This suggests that one can consider
many other priorities by changing the utility function.
As an example, we showed how any the mutual infor-
mation between the distribution of the states being dis-
criminated and the measurement outcomes arises from a
utility function.
Quantum state discrimination is beginning to be seen
as useful in the context of resource theories. In partic-
ular, discrimination tasks can be used to measure the
quality of a quantum resource [4]. This is usually per-
formed in the context of minimal error state discrimina-
tion, where it is known that probability of success (2) can
fully describe the resource theory of quantum measure-
ments [5, 7]. However, the set of all state discimination
tasks is an uncountable set of monotones, making calcula-
tion difficult. In this paper we showed that the total con-
fidence is also a resource monotone. In fact we provides
simple conditions on the utility function which guarantee
that the averaged utility function U() (28) is a resource
monotone. This could lead to a wider class of functions
that can be used to classify the resource theory of quan-
tum measurement; potentially leading to a finite family
of monotones that fully describes this resource theory.
If the average utility U() can be shown to be a re-
source monotone, then we showed in section (V) that this
implies that U() there exists an optimal POVM consist-
ing only of rank-1 elements. This result might be useful
in restricting the set of possible measurements one needs
to search over in trying to find the optimum.
In order to incorporate quantum state discrimination
into Bayesian experimental design, we generalised the
framework in two directions. Firstly, we performed a
maximisation over all decision strategies, instead sim-
ply over individual decisions. This was necessary to de-
scribe maximal confidence state discrimination, whose
utility function depends upon the entire decision strategy.
When the utility function depends only on the explicit
decision made, the framework reduces to the standard
expression. Secondly, we allowed the utility function to
be Rn-valued, equipped with the dictionary order. This
allows one to optimise multiple priorities in turn, subject
to all previous priorities being optimised. We showed the
benefit of this multi-objective optimisation in two cases.
The first is finding the best out of the usual family of
maximal confidence measurements. The second was the
case in which all measurements have the same probability
of success. In this case minimal error state discrimina-
tion is entirely unhelpful. A secondary optimisation of
the mutual information will select the experiment which
on average extracts the most information.
Now that quantum state discrimination has been cast
into the framework of Bayesian experimental design, the
analytic or numerical methods used to solve Bayesian
experimental design optimisation problems may be useful
in finding the optimal measurement for many quantum
state discrimination tasks.
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